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Food prices have increased significantly in the past few years, with particularly sharp
spikes seen during the 2007/08 season (see Fig. 19.1). There is some agreement
on the causes of such price increases: (a) weather shocks that negatively affected
agricultural production; (b) soaring energy and fertilizer costs; (c) rapidly growing
income in developing countries, especially in China and India; (d) the devaluation
of the dollar against most major currencies; (e) increasing demand for biofuels;
and (f) changes in land use patterns. While there is no consensus on the relative
importance of each of these culprits, it is widely agreed that most of these factors
will further increase food prices in the medium and long run. Prices may become
more volatile as well, as evidenced by the subsequent food crisis in 2010. Climate
change will induce more weather variability, leading to erratic production patterns.
Moreover, the volatile nature of the market is likely to induce possible speculation
and exacerbating price spikes. Additionally, in an effort to shield themselves from
price fluctuations, different countries may implement isolating policies, further
exacerbating volatility.
Looking at the volatility at global level is important because, although the food
price spikes of 2008 and 2011 did not reach the heights of the 1970s in real terms
as shown in Fig. 19.2, price volatility—the amplitude of price movements over a
particular period of time—has been at its highest level in the past 15 years.
High and volatile food prices are two different phenomena with distinct implica-
tions for consumers and producers as detailed in Torero (2012). Finally, increased
price volatility over time can also generate larger profits for investors, drawing
new players into the market for agricultural commodities. Increased price volatility
M. Torero ()
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: m.torero@cgiar.org
© The Author(s) 2016
M. Kalkuhl et al. (eds.), Food Price Volatility and Its Implications for Food Security
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 19.2 Real price evolution. Index D 100 in 2015. Source: World Bank
may thus lead to increased—and potentially speculative—trading that in turn can
exacerbate price swings further.
This situation imposes several challenges. In the short run, the global food supply
is relatively inelastic, leading to shortages and amplifying the impact of any shock.
The poorest populations are the ones hit the hardest.1 As a large share of their
1There is a general concern that increasing food prices has especially adverse effects on the poor.
However, until recently, there was no rigorous evidence of this. On the one hand, there would most
probably be negative effects on poor urban consumers who spend a considerable portion of their
budget on food. But on the other, there are gains to farmers who benefit from increased prices for
their output. In general, this impact depends on whether the gains to net agricultural producers
are larger than the losses to consumers. Directly dealing with this issue, Ivanic and Martin (2008)
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income is already being devoted to food, the poor will likely be forced to reduce their
(already low) consumption. Infants and children may suffer lifelong consequences if
they experience serious nutritional deficits during their early years. Thus, the short-
term priority should be to provide temporary relief for vulnerable groups.
In the long run, the goal should be to achieve food security.2 The drivers that
have increased food demand in the last few years are likely to persist (and even
expand). Thus, there will be escalating pressure to meet these demand requirements.
Unfortunately, increases in agricultural productivity have been relatively meager
in recent years. In this line, “the average annual rate of growth of cereal yields
in developing countries fell steadily from 3 % in the late 1970s to less than 1 %
currently, a rate less than that of population growth and much less than the rise of
the use of cereals for other things besides direct use of food” (Delgado et al. 2010,
p 2).
There is a wide array of options to achieve these short- and long-term objectives,
and there are no one-size-fits-all policies. Most policies come with significant trade-
offs, and each government must carefully weigh the benefits and costs they would
face. For example, governments might try to make food more readily available by
reducing food prices through price interventions. While this policy might achieve
its short-term goal, it can potentially entail fiscal deficits and discourage domestic
farmers’ production. Other policies not only have domestic consequences but can
entail side effects for other countries. In their efforts to insulate themselves from
international price fluctuations, some countries might impose trade restrictions; if
a country is a large food exporter, the government might impose export taxes,
quantitative restrictions, or even export bans. Albeit increasing domestic supply and
lowering national prices, these policies would reduce the exported excess supply,
induce even higher international prices, and hurt other nations. In addition, the
“right” policies depend on the particular institutional development of a country.
Middle-income countries might already have safety networks for vulnerable popula-
tions which can trigger prompt aid to those most in need in times of crisis. However,
countries with lower incomes do not have such mechanisms readily available.
Finally, the effectiveness of different policies will vary depending on the market
characteristics of the commodity in which the government is intervening (i.e., the
market structure for wheat is very different from that of rice, which is different from
that of soybeans, etc.).
In this regard, this chapter describes some of the most important policies of
the International Organizations like the World Bank, IFAD, AFD, and the IADB
have prescribed to different countries during the food crisis of 2007/08. The
and Ivanic et al. (2011) find that the food crisis has led to significant increases in poverty rates in
developing countries.
2Food security is a situation in which “all people at all times have physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs, and food preferences for an active
and healthy life” (World Food Summit 1996). Even when increases in food production are not a
sufficient condition for food security, they are indeed a necessary condition thereof (von Braun
et al 1992).
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understanding of such policies is important for at least three reasons. First, food
crises are very sensitive episodes that affect the basic needs of entire populations,
especially those of the world’s poorest countries. As such, they require timely and
sensible measures. Second, increasing food prices and price volatility are likely to
remain an important challenge in the medium and long run. Third, food policies are
usually complex; they need to be assessed to consider their domestic impact, the
trade-offs that they entail with respect to other objectives, their consequences for
other countries, and their feasibility in particular contexts.
This chapter is divided into five sections (excluding the introduction). The second
section analyzes a series of policies recommended by international organizations
during the 2007/08 crisis and the policies recommended at the G8 Meeting of
Finance Ministers in Osaka, June 13–14, 2008. The third section analyzes the
policy recommendations which came out after the 2007/08 crisis and which were
the result of research work done by the same international organizations. First,
some short-term policies are analyzed in which two mechanisms are emphasized:
support for the poor and price stabilization (with an emphasis on trade restrictions
and food reserves). Second, medium- and long-term policies to increase agricultural
productivity, through productivity gains and elimination of postharvest losses, are
discussed. The fourth section describes specific loans and policies prescribed for
selected countries during the 2007/08 food crisis. It analyzes their consistency
and cohesiveness when contrasted with the general policies that some International
Organizations formally recommended as well as with those policies that were rec-
ommended after 2008. The final section summarizes and presents some concluding
remarks.
19.2 Proposed Policies and the G8 Summit
In this section, a detailed description of the policies officially proposed and the
G8’s document prepared for the Ministers of Finance Meeting in 2008 (Table 19.1
presents a summary of all these policies) are presented. These policies can be
classified either as short-term policies or as medium- and long-term policies.
Specifically, within the short-term policies, we identify two groups of policies:
(a) short-term support for the poorest and (b) price stabilization policies.
19.2.1 Short-Term Policies (Social Protection and Trade Policies)
19.2.1.1 Short-Term Support for the Poorest
Governments’ short-term objective is to increase access to food, especially for the
most vulnerable shares of their population. In this sense, policies should provide
targeted short-term subsidies to those in the most distress. Countries that already
have Targeted Cash Transfer (TCT) and Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs
in place can scale them up and increase the subsidies they provide (World Bank
2008). TCTs provide additional income to poor households with children or disabled
or elderly members. CCTs provide the same benefits but are contingent on some
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conditionality (which usually encompasses an educational, nutritional, or health
requirement). These approaches of cash transfer constitute first-best responses for
several reasons: (a) they prioritize assistance for targeted groups, (b) they do not
entail additional costs of food storage and transportation, (c) they do not distort
food markets, and (d) in the case of CCTs, they explicitly prevent human capital
deterioration. However, there is an important shortcoming to these approaches:
countries with weaker administrative capacity—which are usually those most
affected by food crises—are less likely to have implemented any TCTs or CCTs.3
In this line, Delgado et al. (2010) argue that “it is essential that during noncrisis
years, countries invest in strengthening existing programs—and piloting new ones—
to address chronic poverty, achieve food security and human development goals, and
be ready to respond to shocks.”
When TCTs and CCTs are not available, governments may implement other
types of assistance programs. First, school feeding (SF) programs might be useful
to relieve child malnourishment. However, they are usually ineffective to combat
infant malnutrition (when adequate nutrition is most needed), unless food consumed
at school can be complemented with take-home rations for younger siblings.
Additionally, SF relies on geographic rather than household-specific targeting and
entails food storage and distributions costs. Food for Work (FfW) programs are a
second option. These are easier to implement and are (in principle) self-targeted:
they provide low wages so only poor people should be interested in participating.
However, in very poor regions, the vast amount of unemployed and underemployed
may lead to considerable leakages and distortions in the labor market (Wodon and
Zaman 2008). Also, only a portion of the funds allocated to these programs directly
cuts poverty. Beneficiaries leave other jobs to participate in them; thus, the benefits
of FfW are not the whole wages they provide, but only the differential income (with
respect to the previous job). These programs might create distortions in the labor
market. Finally, governments can also provide direct food aid. However, there is
no guarantee that this aid can be effectively targeted toward the most vulnerable
populations. Furthermore, food aid may become an entitlement and might result in
long-term fiscal problems.
19.2.1.2 Price Stabilization Policies
Support programs for the poorest might not be easily implemented during food
emergencies because they take time to be put into action. At the very least, they
require a distribution network and plenty of logistical coordination. This forces
governments to implement other policies to shield their population from food emer-
gencies. Moreover, even when technically sound schemes such as CCTs are readily
available during a crisis, some countries might still try to pursue more widespread
3For example, these policies might be more suitable for medium-income countries, such as in Latin
America. World Bank—LAC (2008, Table 8) documents 17 countries with CCTs and 18 countries
with Targeted Nutritional or Social Assistance Programs.
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measures for political reasons.4 Constituencies (and, in general, populations) are
very sensitive to food prices, and governments may fear opposition, turmoil, or
even being ousted. For example, Burkina Faso suspended import taxes on four
commodities after the country experienced riots over food prices in February 2008.
Other countries that experienced riots during the 2007/08 crisis were Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Indonesia, Mauritania, Senegal, and
Yemen (Demeke et al. 2008).
In this light, many countries try to stabilize prices through trade policies and
management of food reserves. The specific trade-offs imposed by these mechanisms
will be discussed subsequently. In general, they are not first-best options: countries
use scarce resources to reduce general prices, effectively subsidizing both the poor
and the nonpoor5 and creating potentially pervasive market distortions. However,
countries with no other means or with politically unstable regimes may have few
other options to cope with food emergencies.
19.2.2 Medium- and Long-Term Policies
Short-term responses mainly deal with demand problems as consumers—and
especially the poor—are hard-hit. However, short-term policies that help consumers
might be detrimental for producers and for market development in the long run. For
example, export taxes on wheat in Argentina help decrease consumer prices, but also
disincentive production. As suggested by a newspaper article, “with scant incentive
to produce, farmers have slashed the land sown with wheat to a 111-year low, and
cereal exports from the rolling pampas of what should be a breadbasket country
have virtually halved over the past 5 years. Wheat farmers in Argentina have turned
to other crops, such as soybean, while some international investors, who are critical
to the flow of money into capital-intensive agriculture, have left the country and
turned to Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil”.6 While acknowledging the importance of
short-term responses to food crises, these responses should be chosen to minimize
any long-term adverse effects on agricultural supply.
4As suggested by HDN and PREM (2008), “effective nutritional and social protection interventions
can protect the most vulnerable from the devastating consequences of nutritional deprivation, asset
depletion and reductions in education and health spending. Policy responses need to balance
political economy considerations that call for measures to help a broad swath of the affected
population, with the urgency of protecting the very poor.”
5Wodon and Zaman (2008) posit the following argument: “Consider the share of rice consumption
in the bottom 40% of the population. This share varies from 11% in Mali to 32% in Sierra Leone.
This means that if one considers the bottom 40% as the poor, out of every dollar spent by a
government for reducing indirect taxes on rice, and assuming that the indirect tax cuts result in a
proportionate reduction in consumer prices, only about 20 cents will benefit the poor on average.”
6“Argentina’s farmers unable to fill the wheat gap,” Financial Times, August 10th, 2007. Link:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/910f25ac-a4a8-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vXMMOjP5
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Long-term policies that expand food availability are becoming increasingly
important.7 Agricultural demand has experienced large expansions in recent years—
even above that regularly imposed by population growth—due to rapidly growing
incomes in developing countries (such as China and India) and rising demand of
food for biofuel production in developed countries.8 As these patterns are likely to
persist, there is a need to increase agricultural supply in order to keep up with the
additional demand.9
There are two main policies targeted toward increasing food production. The rate
of growth of the yields of major crops has been declining steadily since the 1970s.
Thus, on the one hand, there is the need to enhance the productivity and resilience
of major crops. Yet many challenges will make this a daunting task. Availability of
fertile land will be limited by increasing urbanization, salinization, erosion, and
degradation. Water will also become scarcer. Additionally, climate change will
most certainly have an adverse effect on agricultural production through erratic
rainfall, pest proliferation, and crop failure. Thus, any policy to increase agricultural
productivity should address these complex obstacles.
On the other hand, supply can also be expanded through the enhancement of
postharvest practices. Between harvest and consumers’ access to food, agricultural
production goes through many stages: product processing, storage, handling, trans-
portation, and distribution. In each of these phases, there are production losses. For
example, grains molder with improper storage technologies and facilities, as well as
poor roads, preventing food from reaching markets. Albeit complementary, even in
the absence of productivity gains, better postharvest practices can have a significant
impact on food availability.
19.3 Policies Recommended After 2008
19.3.1 Short-Term Policies
19.3.1.1 Trade Policies
When faced with increasing food prices, net food exporters can impose export
taxes or bans. While lower prices hurt local producers, these policies do benefit
7Examples of other policies in the long run are: production and price insurance for farmers;
provision of other public goods for rural areas (such as education and health services); policies for
water basin management; technology improvements for rainfed land (water capture infrastructure,
practices for water retention in soil, etc.); strengthening of producer organizations; etc. Certainly,
these are also important policies. However, for the sake of brevity, they are not mentioned here.
8Mitchell (2008) estimates that about 70–75 % of food price increases were due to rising food
demand for biofuel production.
9As suggested by the World Bank’s South Asia Region report (2010), “the food crisis is by no
means over : : : There is growing agreement that a two-track approach is required, combining
investments in safety nets with measures to stimulate broad-based agricultural productivity growth,
with major emphasis on major food staples.”
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domestic consumers and boost the revenue of governments enacting them. Thus, it
is not surprising that many food-producing countries enacted some form of export
restriction during the 2007/08 food crisis. Demeke et al. (2008) surveyed different
government policies in 81 developing countries and found that 25 of them either
banned exports completely or increased export taxes.
Analogously, net food importers can decrease their tariffs (or even subsidize
imports) to buffer the impact of rising international food prices. At least in the
short run, these policies are able to temporarily reduce internal prices; however, they
also have domestic side effects (see Table 19.1). Some argue that tariff reductions
might not have been effective in shielding importing countries from the 2007/08
food crisis. FAO et al. (2011) argue that “the scale of price increases was such that
for many countries reducing import tariffs had relatively modest impact because
the initial tariffs were low or the scale of the price increases was so large. In
any event, this instrument was quickly exhausted as tariffs were reduced to zero”
(p. 14). Additionally, tariff reductions diminish governments’ revenue, leaving them
with fewer resources with which to palliate the impact of food price increases.
The situation might be especially serious when there are few alternative sources
of revenue (e.g., weak tax collection, large informal sector, etc.). Eventually, this
could lead to serious fiscal deficits.
These strategies should not entail any consequences for international markets if
only small countries implement them. These countries’ food exports or imports are
not substantial relative to international trade, and they are mostly price takers on the
world markets. However, trade policies of large food exporters or importers do effec-
tively affect international supply or demand of a commodity. When large exporters
impose export restrictions during a food emergency, they tighten the already short
supply abroad and further increase international prices. In a similar fashion, as
large food importers reduce their tariffs, they increase internal consumption, fueling
global demand and generating further escalations of food prices in external markets.
If exporting and importing countries both follow these strategies, their efforts to
insulate themselves might cancel out each other’s efforts.
Martin and Anderson (2011) describe this phenomenon on the international mar-
ket for a certain commodity. Initially, there is excess supply from world’s exporters
and excess demand from importers. The authors then consider an exogenous shock
that reduces production in some exporting countries. In the absence of any trade
policy, this shock changes the balance between supply and demand. If a large
exporting country tries to avoid an increase in domestic prices and imposes a tax
on exports, this further reduces the excess supply and leads to higher international
prices. If a large importing country retaliates and reduces its tariffs to exactly
offset the trade policy imposed by the large exporter, this would increase global
excess demand. The final outcome in this scenario is that the traded quantity and
price in both countries would be the same as before either policy was enacted.
However, other countries around the world would be worse off, as the final price
on the international market would soar. This can eventually give other countries
the incentive to impose similar policies, leading to a trade war of import tariffs
and export taxes. As Martin and Anderson (2011) suggest, “insulation generates a
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classic collective-action problem akin to when a crowd stands up in a stadium: no
one gets a better view by standing, but any that remain seated gets a worse view.”
So to what extent should countries implement such policies and impose beggar-
thy-neighbor consequences upon others? There is no consensus in this respect. On
one hand, Timmer (2010) analyzes the implications of trade restrictions on rice
markets during the 2007/08 food crisis and finds that stabilizing domestic prices
using domestic border intervention could be an effective strategy to handle food
crises. Timmer argues that unstable demand and supply needs to be accommodated
somehow, and that passing this responsibility to the international market may be the
most fair and successful way to do so.
On the other hand, Anderson and Nelgen (2012) advise against any trade
restrictions, using a model of supply and demand for the market of a particular
commodity. Their results are presented in Tables 19.2 and 19.3. Table 19.2, not
surprisingly, shows that trade restrictions did boost international food price increases
between 2006 and 2008.10 Yet the results also suggest that everyone should take part
of the blame for this: the policies of both exporting and importing countries, and
both developing and high-income countries, fueled the price increases. Table 19.3
compares the changes in international prices that would have taken place without
trade interventions with effective domestic prices. All in all, their estimates show
that these policies had a very heterogeneous impact for different countries and
commodities. On average for all countries, domestic wheat prices increased more
than adjusted international prices. These policies were somewhat more effective for
other crops, but overall their effect was not large: 2 % for maize and 12 % for rice.
Anderson and Nelgen (2012) advise governments to refrain from imposing
insulating trade policies because they amplify price increases and, moreover, are not
always effective. Theoretically, small countries cannot affect international markets
individually by changing their trade policies. However, Anderson and Nelgen (2012)
claim that if many small countries do so simultaneously, it can have an aggregate
Table 19.2 Contributions of high-income and developing countries, and of importing and
exporting countries, to the proportion of the international price change that is due to policy-induced
















Rice 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.18 0.22
Wheat 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.12
Maize 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07
aTaken from Anderson and Nelgen (2012), Table 7
10Their findings are qualitatively consistent with those of Bouët and Laborde (2010). Their
calculations are based on a multicountry general equilibrium model for wheat. They show how
price increases are amplified by both tariffs and export taxes.
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Table 19.3 Comparison of the domestic price with the rise in international grain prices net of
the contribution of changed trade restrictions; rice, wheat, and maize, 2006–2008 (% unweighted
averages)a













Rice 113 68 56 48 74
Wheat 70 56 77 65 81
Maize 83 75 73 62 82
aTaken from Anderson and Nelgen (2012), Table 8
sizeable impact. In this line, they argue that trade restrictions and reduction of import
tariffs should be discouraged across the board.
To analyze this last point, Table 19.4 shows the shares of imports and exports
for soybean, rice, wheat, and maize by region (following the World Bank classi-
fication)11 in 2004, before the food crisis. We posit that Anderson and Nelgen’s
results (in Tables 19.2 and 19.3) seem to hide very large disparities within their
“exporting,” “importing,” “developing,” and “high-income” labels. For example,
estimates in Table 19.2 show the impact of trade restrictions on the increase of the
international price of rice to be around 40 %; 38 % is from developing (with the
remaining 2 % from high-income countries) and 18 % is from importing countries
(and the remaining 22 % from exporting countries). From the export side, Thailand,
India, and Vietnam—which account for 65 % of all rice exports—imposed trade
restrictions. From the import side, important importers such as the Philippines and
other Asian countries were concerned about a potential shortage and reduced their
tariffs. Policies enacted by these large players exemplify how trade restrictions can
lead to significant price spikes. However, from the evidence presented in Tables 19.2
and 19.3, it is unclear if trade restrictions by smaller countries would entail serious
consequences for international markets. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts
for 0.1 % of rice exports worldwide. Excluding Nigeria, South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire,
and Ghana, the share of all other Sub-Saharan African countries was only 10.7 %
of worldwide rice imports. It is reasonable to believe that, even if all nations in
this region changed their trade policies, there would not be a sizable impact on the
international rice market.
While economists tend to be more critical of the use of import barriers as creating
instability in world markets, they frequently applaud import barrier reductions
undertaken in the same context. There may be some basis for this support if the
reduction is believed to be permanent once undertaken. If, however, it is undertaken
purely on a temporary basis as a way to reduce the instability of domestic prices, the
effects on the instability of world prices are clearly quite symmetric. From a policy
11See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups
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Table 19.4 Share of exports and imports by region and selected countries for soybeans, maize,
wheat, and rice (2004)
1.A: Soybean exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 7,563,204 48.5
United States of America 6,692,040 42.9
All others 871,164 5.6
East Asia & Pacific 161,858 1.0
Europe & Central Asia 17,518 0.1
Latin America & Caribbean 7,827,815 50.2
Brazil 5,394,910 34.6
Argentina 1,740,110 11.2
All others 692,795 4.4
Middle East & North Africa 315 0.0
South Asia 897 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 7144 0.0
Others 5101 0.0
Total 15,583,852 100.0
1.B: Soybean imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)




All others 3,627,370 18.5
East Asia & Pacific 8,935,462 45.6
China 7,680,418 39.2
All others 1,255,044 6.4
Europe & Central Asia 252,591 1.3
Latin America & Caribbean 1,693,014 8.6
Mexico 1,107,990 5.7
All others 585,024 3.0
Middle East & North Africa 605,239 3.1
South Asia 36,913 0.2






2.A: Rice (milled) exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 1,324,307 18.0
East Asia & Pacific 3,534,287 47.9
Thailand 2,368,150 32.1
Vietnam 950,315 12.9
All others 215,822 2.9
Europe & Central Asia 18,692 0.3
Latin America & Caribbean 174,862 2.4
Middle East & North Africa 227,739 3.1
South Asia 2,076,696 28.2
India 1,448,460 19.6
Pakistan 627,240 8.5
All others 996 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 9500 0.1
Others 5479 0.1
Total 7,371,562 100.0
2.B: Rice (milled) imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 2,341,903 35.1
Saudi Arabia 534,327 8.0
United Arab Emirates 327,843 4.9
United States of America 257,666 3.9
All others 1,222,067 18.3
East Asia & Pacific 1,045,859 15.7
Philippines 274,585 4.1
China 268,003 4.0
All others 503,271 7.5
Europe & Central Asia 187,705 2.8
Latin America & Caribbean 408,097 6.1
Middle East & North Africa 713,678 10.7
Iran 294,853 4.4
Iraq 173,481 2.6
All others 245,344 3.7
South Asia 320,804 4.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,488,627 22.3
Nigeria 297,000 4.4
South Africa 202,605 3.0
Côte d’Ivoire 166,656 2.5
Ghana 108,412 1.6
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Table 19.4 (continued)
3.A: Wheat exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 15,522,857 80.4




All others 2,010,897 10.4
East Asia & Pacific 116,505 0.6
Europe & Central Asia 1,463,350 7.6
Russian Federation 535,975 2.8
Kazakhstan 389,550 2.0
Ukraine 288,900 1.5
All others 248,925 1.3
Latin America & Caribbean 1,663,311 8.6
Argentina 1,365,480 7.1
All others 297,831 1.5
Middle East & North Africa 161,885 0.8
South Asia 328,790 1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 49,506 0.3
Others 30 0.0
Total 19,306,234 100.0
3.B: Wheat imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 7,160,391 33.0




Europe & Central Asia 1,437,367 6.6




Middle East & North Africa 3,644,814 16.8
South Asia 553,803 2.6









4.A: Maize exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 8,568,195 73.3
United States 6,137,510 52.5
France 1,456,650 12.5
All others 974,035 8.3
East Asia & Pacific 522,558 4.5
Europe & Central Asia 311,766 2.7
Latin America & Caribbean 1,926,278 16.5
Argentina 1,193,810 10.2
Brazil 597,336 5.1
All others 135,132 1.2
Middle East & North Africa 13,878 0.1
South Asia 155,724 1.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 191,276 1.6
Others 774 0.0
Total 11,690,449 100.0
4.B: Maize imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 8,296,019 58.7
Japan 2,931,850 20.7
Korea 1,431,560 10.1
All others 3,932,609 27.8
East Asia & Pacific 1,433,257 10.1
China 818,609 5.8
Malaysia 330,943 2.3
All others 283,705 2.0
Europe & Central Asia 500,491 3.5
Latin America & Caribbean 2,138,720 15.1
Mexico 745,120 5.3
Colombia 332,085 2.3
All others 1,061,515 7.5




All others 667,843 4.7
South Asia 76,319 0.5
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viewpoint, this remains an important distinction because the multilateral trading
system has quite different rules in the two cases (see Bouët and Laborde 2010).
In addition, any of these policies may have important beggar-thy-neighbor
consequences and may fuel price increases of important commodities. Insulating
trade policies imposed by importers and exporters (as well as high-income and
developing countries) were indeed responsible for a considerable share of price
spikes seen during the 2007/08 food crisis. However, most of the turmoil was likely
caused by large exporters and importers. In this sense, policy recommendations
should distinguish between larger and smaller countries.
Finally, there is a key asymmetry between net exporters and net importers of
an agricultural commodity during a food crisis. Net exporters can benefit from
increases in world prices, but net importers are hurt and have no capacity to retaliate
efficiently. If large exporting and importing countries cooperate, then it is possible
for smaller countries to implement policies to reduce import tariffs and, in the
short term, reduce national prices. Clearly, however, any non-cooperation by large
importing countries implementing similar policies will neutralize this effect.
19.3.1.2 Food Reserves
Food reserves can be maintained in order to service emergency relief operations,
support public distribution of food to chronically food insecure shares of a coun-
try’s population, and reduce volatility in consumer and/or producer prices, thus
stabilizing prices. The basic idea is simple: accumulate food stocks when prices are
low (to prevent very low prices that would harm producers) and release them when
supply becomes tighter (to reduce very high prices that harm consumers). However,
international experience in the management and use of reserves is not clear and
is open to significant variation in policies under the Global Food Crises Response
Program (GFRP) operations because the so-called strategic grain reserves were not
clearly defined.
Timmer (2010) advises governments to hold rice buffer stocks to reduce volatility
in the domestic market. Rather than requiring governments to cope with the
consequences of food crises, reserves would ensure price stability and prevent acute
crises from taking place. However, Timmer’s recommendations should be taken
with caution, as his analysis is very specific to the rice market, which is much more
speculative than other markets.
Gouel and Jean (2012) argue that buffer stocks do not provide relief when there
are sharp increases in international food prices. Using a theoretical model for a small
open economy, the authors find that buffer stocks might help producers by keeping
prices from reaching low levels. However, such stocks do not protect consumers
from price spikes without further trade restrictions; this is because small economies
are price takers, so domestic prices will follow the international markets (adjusted
by transport costs). When prices are high on the international market and there are
no export restrictions in place, at least part of the reserves accumulated in buffer
stocks will be exported, given that there is no need for local distribution, and
will maximize the returns to the commodities being held, which need to rotate to
minimize operation costs. While these policies may increase governments’ revenues
482 M. Torero
(exporting their stocks when international prices are high), they do not protect
consumers from high commodity prices.
Domestic buffer stocks posit other problems. First, as they aim to control general
prices, they are less effectively targeted toward the neediest shares of a country’s
population (Wright 2009). Second, storage can be expensive, and the poorest
countries (which are most vulnerable to food crises) are the ones least likely to
be able to afford expensive storage costs (Torero 2011). Third, poor management
renders buffer stocks ineffective in many cases. When controlled by parastatals
and other government agencies without strong accountability systems, they are
potentially subject to political use and mismanagement. Finally, buffer stocks
create market distortions; as perishable reserves have to be rotated, their cyclical
interventions in the market can send wrong signals to producers and consumers.
For most of these authors, national emergency reserves seem to be a better option
than domestic buffer stocks for price stabilization. While buffer stocks for price
intervention require considerable stockpiling and subsidize both the poor and the
nonpoor, emergency food reserves can more effectively provide aid to the most
vulnerable shares of a country’s population and entail smaller costs because they
require smaller reserves (see Wright 2009). Also, reserves are less likely to create
market distortions and disrupt private sector activities (FAO et al. 2011). These
mechanisms might prove especially useful for isolated or landlocked countries
where, in case of distress, sluggish transportation of food assistance can pose serious
threats to vulnerable shares of the population.
The extreme volatility observed during the 2007/08 food crisis suggests that
some mechanism of food reserves for price stabilization is necessary to ease the
effect of shocks during periods of commodity price spikes and high volatility.
(For further discussion of such mechanisms, see Chap. 6 of this book.) There
seems to be some consensus around this idea, but policymakers disagree about
which specific mechanisms to use to implement such food reserves. As in the case
of trade interventions, the most appropriate choices are likely to depend on the
characteristics of the specific market under intervention, each country’s capacity
to cope with crises, and the possibility of establishing international coordination
mechanisms. While it likely does not make sense to establish national buffer stocks
in most grain markets, Timmer’s (2010) support for them may be more valid in a few
cases. For example, rice markets might be more speculative than others; thus, price
stabilization through buffer stocks makes somewhat more sense in this case. On the
other hand, buffer stocks usually entail high costs and market distortions and are
prone to corruption. Thus, most countries—especially those with weak institutions
and scarce resources—should probably refrain from using stocks and should instead
establish emergency reserves for humanitarian reasons.
19.3.2 Medium- and Long-Term Policies
In this section, we summarize the major medium- and long-term policies proposed.
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19.3.2.1 Policies to Increase Agricultural Productivity and Resilience
There is a wide array of policies aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and
resilience; some of the most widely discussed include:
Input Subsidies
The World Bank (2008) argues that “while development of efficient agricultural
input market is a long-term process, this subcomponent (improving smallholder
access to seed and fertilizer) would provide rapid support to clients facing immedi-
ate and near-term constraints related to seed and fertilizer availability, distribution,
affordability and utilization” (p. 90). The plan envisages the implementation of a
market-smart approach, characterized by: (a) targeting poor farmers; (b) not dis-
placing existing commercial sales; (c) utilizing vouchers, matching grants, or other
instruments to strengthen private distribution systems; and (d) being introduced for
limited periods of time only.
While they provide a sensible rationale, it is unclear how these principles
would be implemented in practice. Poorer countries—which likely have the least
developed input markets—may find it difficult to target only those farmers in need.
Additionally, subsidy programs that would strengthen, rather than displace, the
private sector are likely to require complex mechanisms; institutional weaknesses
in poor countries may render these programs unfeasible.
Moreover, these programs usually entail significant fiscal costs. Zaman et al.
(2008) estimate that Malawi’s input subsidy program costs approximately 3 % of
GDP. Importantly, in recent years, rising fuel prices have considerably increased
fertilizer costs. If this trend continues in the future, the budget implications of these
policies would become even larger.
Finally, more evidence is required to assess the effectiveness of these policies.
Dorward et al. (2010) evaluate the 2005/06–2008/09 fertilizer subsidy program
in Malawi; their estimates of the benefit–cost ratios of the program range from
0.76 to 1.36, with a (rather small) mid-estimate of 1.06. Arguably, with recent
increases in fertilizer prices, a current benefit–cost ratio of the program may be
even smaller. Additional potentially adverse impacts of the displacement of private
sector operations still require more thorough evaluation and understanding.
Investment in Research and Development
The introduction of high-yield varieties was instrumental for increases in agricul-
tural supply during the 1960s and 1970s. The foreseeable worsening of climatic
conditions imposes new challenges, however. Currently, new strands of wheat,
maize, rice, and other crops are being developed to have enhanced resistance to
droughts, diseases and insects, salinity and other soil problems, extreme tempera-
tures, and floods. In addition, other developments promise enriched varieties with
higher nutritional content.
Such policies are highly profitable. Byerlee et al. (2008) find that “many
international and national investments in R&D have paid off handsomely, with an
average internal rate of return of 43 % in 700 R&D projects evaluated in developing
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countries in all regions” (p. 11). However, research and development (R&D) is a
typical public good and, as such, faces considerable underinvestment, particularly
in developing countries. Thus, governments must expand their expenditures in R&D
and must complement this budget increase with other policies. For example, the
sustainability of these programs requires private–public participation in the seed
industry to generate demand and supply coordination. It also requires strengthening
regulatory policies in seed markets, including variety release, seed certification, and
phytosanitary measures. R&D should also envisage extension services and other
mechanisms to facilitate diffusion and technology adoption by farmers.
Irrigation
Investment in irrigation should be a critical component of any strategy to increase
agricultural supply. Irrigation more than doubles the yields of rain-fed areas because
more crops can be harvested in any given year; it also at least partially promotes
resilience, protecting farmers against droughts. Delgado et al. (2010) estimate that
expansion of irrigation infrastructure to all land in developing countries “would
contribute about half of the total value of needed food supply by 2050.”12
Irrigation projects appear to exhibit high rates of return. Jones (1995) analyzes
208 World Bank-funded irrigation projects and finds an average rate of return of
15 %. Despite the importance and impact of such projects, the Global Food Crises
Response Program (GFRP) has determined that “under this emergency response
program, it is not anticipated that investment support would be provided for new
irrigation schemes, as this would be supported under the Bank’s regular lending
program.”13
19.3.2.2 Policies to Reduce Postharvest Losses
Developing countries face significant postharvest losses due to mishandling. For
cereals, these are estimated to be 10–15 % of harvest; when combined with
deterioration in storage (in farms and facilities) and milling, this number can reach
25 %. Poor (or nonexistent) roads compound these losses, as agricultural products
cannot reach consumer markets, and information failures impede supply from
reaching demand (or at least prevent it from reaching the most efficient markets).
Some of the policies discussed to reduce postharvest wastage include:
12This would require, however, 40 % more withdrawals of water for agriculture. Thus, these
policies should be complemented by increased productivity in existing irrigated areas.
13GFRP would limit their financing to: (i) support quick turnaround physical investments in
rehabilitation of existing irrigation (small-scale) schemes; (ii) finance investments in rehabilitation
or development of field drainage and collector drains to reduce problems of water logging and soil
salinity; (iii) finance training for water-user groups and others on operation and maintenance of
investments; (iv) finance assessments of groundwater or surface water hydrology and sustainable
water use; and (v) finance feasibility studies for medium-term irrigation investments.
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Improved Handling of Harvests and Storage Practices
Significant portions of agricultural production are lost due to postharvest mishan-
dling. One example comes from improper drying of crops. If crops are stored in high
humidity, they can be affected by mycotoxins and become unfit for consumption.
In addition to the risk of growing mold, production stored in improper containers
can also attract plagues, insects, and rodents, which can spoil the food. This is
only one example of postharvest mishandling in a process where any number of
small practices can potentially spoil food. Training in proper drying techniques and
building adequate infrastructure in this area can considerably reduce wastage and
improve food availability.
The implementation of extension services for postharvest losses should include:
(1) training and demonstration of low cost-on-farm storage; (2) technical assistance
and investment support for community-level food banks; and (3) training and
investment support for grain traders and millers in drying and sorting, as well as
fumigation equipment and upgrades in existing storage facilities. These should be
complemented with strengthening inspections and quality control surveillance to
prevent the spread of pests or diseases.
Information Systems
Imperfect information is especially pervasive in agricultural markets at both the
domestic and the international levels. In both cases, a lack of adequate and timely
information creates a mismatch between supply and demand. In many cases,
the consequence is the allocation of production to suboptimal markets, where
the demand is lower. In other cases, severe information constraints can result in
agricultural production not reaching any market at all and thus being wasted.
At the domestic level, many countries have implemented agricultural information
systems that can be accessed through internet portals, SMS on mobile phones,
kiosks, radio shows, etc. The challenge ahead is to find cost-effective mechanisms
to produce timely information that can be easily and widely accessed by producers
and traders.
At the international level, there is scarce reliable data on stocks and availability
of grains and oilseeds. Additionally, there is little monitoring of the state of
crops and short-term forecasts based on trustworthy technology (remote sensing,
meteorological information, etc.). FAO et al. (2011) proposed the creation of the
Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which involves major agricultural
exporters and importers, as well as international organizations with expertise in food
policy. It comprises two organisms: the Global Food Market Information Group
(to collect and analyze food market information) and the Rapid Response Forum
(to promote international coordination). While the specific details of its duties
and membership (and the political negotiations surrounding them) still need to be




Transport infrastructure plays an important role in the reduction of both the level and
variability of food prices. Without roads to transport their agricultural production,
some farmers cannot reach consumer markets; others have market access, but at
a very high cost. Delgado et al. (2010) argue that, in most cases, transport costs
represent 50–60 % of total marketing costs. Byerlee et al. (2008) estimate that
less than 50 % of the rural African population lives close to an all-season road.
Transport infrastructure can also help reduce price variability. Roads are useful
means to spread out regional shocks; if a certain region is hit by a shock (weather or
other), it can import food from another region. For example, during the food crisis,
regions with better infrastructure in Indonesia were not hit as hard as those poorly
connected.
19.4 Analysis of Consistency
The question that this section tries to answer is how consistent or inconsistent the
operational policy recommendations have been with respect to: (a) Proposals of
International Organizations and the G8’s document prepared for the Ministers of
Finance Meeting in 2008 and (b) the different policy recommendations proposed
by key researchers and analyzed in detail in the previous two sections. With this
objective in mind, we analyze as an experiment the portfolio of loans of GFRP
operations detailed in Table 19.5, covering operations in 13 developing countries.
Table 19.6 provides a detailed summary of all these World Bank operations which




Country Project ID PAD ICR
Mozambique 107313  
Djibouti 112017  
Honduras 112023  N/A
Haiti 112133  N/A
Bangladesh 112761  
Sierra Leone 113219  
Madagascar 113224  
Rwanda 113232  N/A
Burundi 113438  
Philippines 113492  
Guinea 113625  
Mali 114269  N/A
Cambodia 117203  
Note: PAD is Project Appraisal Document
of the World Bank and ICR is the Imple-
mentation, Completion and Results Report
of the World Bank












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 19.7 Summary of operations
Official position of World Bank during
2007/08
Policies recommended by the World
Bank after 2008
Consistent Not consistent Consistent Not consistent
Mozambique X X
Bangladesh X X
Philippines X X X
Djibouti X X X
Honduras X X
Haiti X X X
Cambodia X X (export ban) X X
Mali X X X X
Guinea X X (export ban) X X
Burundi X X X
Madagascar X X X
Sierra Leone X X X X
Rwanda X X
Following an assessment of each of the specific operations for the 13 developing
countries, benefits are analyzed and summarized in Table 19.7:
(a) Mozambique: Overall, consistent with the policy recommendations in 2007/08
and after 2008. The government allowed a pass-through of international prices
while protecting vulnerable groups (expanding PSA program). In addition,
through the GFRP operation, the World Bank supported the implementation
of reforms to increase agricultural productivity through the provision of
infrastructure and public goods (technology adoption, construction of silos,
agricultural infrastructure, etc.).
(b) Bangladesh: Overall, consistent with the policy recommendations on trade
in 2007/08 but not consistent with later World Bank research after 2008.
Specifically, the GFRP operation was used in accordance with the GFRP
framework to support the reduction of import duties for rice and wheat, and
there was an increase of public food stocks (at least partially to act as price
buffers) from 1 to 1.5 million tons. On the other hand, it is important to mention
that the increased public targeting for aid programs was positive in terms of
performance of the program in identifying the proper beneficiaries. However,
most of it was untargeted and had severe leakages (e.g., large share of budget
allocated to open market sales).
(c) Philippines: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were consistent with the official World Bank policy recommendations in
2007/08 and were both consistent and inconsistent with the post-2008 rec-
ommendations. On the consistent side, as a result of the GFRP operation, the
government launched the Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction
(NHTS-PR) and introduced a CCT (Pantawid Pamilya). In addition, the NHTS-
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PR will become a targeting instrument for other social programs, and the Food
for School Program is prioritizing the poorest provinces and municipalities to
enhance targeting of the most vulnerable share of the population. Finally, the
government pushed for a regional rice reserve mechanism through ASEAN,
which is an emergency regional rice reserve to assure food security in the region
and which has a very clear trigger mechanism and governance. In addition, the
country was engaged in large rice import tenders, exacerbating increases in
international food prices, but the GFRP made the government commit, as part
of the loan, to change its tendering policy in a way that would reduce prices.
The government also agreed to withdraw a big tender that was going to increase
price pressure in the international market. Finally, bilateral rice deals were
established, reducing pressure on external markets. These policies, although
consistent in the short term with the GFRP framework, are inconsistent with
later World Bank recommendations. In the medium term, the government is
due to lift quantitative trade restrictions by WTO agreements, and there is a
medium-term plan to transfer rice trade to the private sector. However, currently
the National Food Authority (NFA) has the monopoly over rice imports. NFA
still concentrates a significant proportion of its food aid budget, which is poorly
targeted. NFA’s reserves act as a buffer stock for price stabilization.
(d) Djibouti: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were consistent in general with the official World Bank policy but which,
at the same time, were inconsistent with the policy recommendations after
2008. On the consistent side, when the crisis started, there were few social
protection mechanisms; the government was able to expand the WFP-operated
food assistance program in rural areas (one of the few existing) with GFRP
support. It also completed a population census as a first step to implement
direct and targeted protection mechanisms for the poor and provided support
for fisheries to boost food production. On the inconsistent side with the post-
2008 recommendations but consistent with the GFRP framework and official
policy of the World Bank, the government eliminated the consumption tax rates
on five basic staples; this policy was not effective in reducing consumer food
prices. Low pass-through rates were probably due to high concentration in the
food market (few importers and distributors) and security risks posed by pirates
in international waters.
(e) Honduras: Overall, consistent with the policy recommendations. The proposed
operation seems to be more oriented to releasing funds for the government to
aid the financial sector, given the government is concerned about the effect of
increasing food prices on households’ real income; therefore, the government
uses the resources as a buffer to mitigate the expected adverse effect on banks’
outstanding portfolio of consumer loans. However, the financial sector was not
the real target of the operation; it was just the fastest way to transfer cash to the
government for more general crisis response policies.
(f) Haiti: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which were
both consistent and inconsistent with the policy recommendations. On the
consistent side, as a result of the GFRP, a “Program of Action against the
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High Cost of Living” (with a focus on employment generation through labor-
intensive works and expansion of food assistance programs) was developed.
In addition, the government also implemented what they refer to in the GFRP
framework as a second best policy, i.e., subsidies to reduce the price of rice
between May and December 2008 (US$30 million). However, there are specific
circumstances that need to be met for the Bank to accept this type of policy
(see GFRP Framework document p.26, para. B2). Moreover, post-2008 these
policies were not supported.
(g) Cambodia: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were consistent with the GFRP framework and official position of the World
Bank. Despite the initial ban on rice exports in March 2008, they lifted this
ban in May 2008 and are currently seeking to promote rice production. The
main policy is to create price incentives by promoting exports (goal of one
million tons of milled rice exported by 2015). In addition, they expanded the
“Identification of Poor Households Targeting Program” to be applied to safety
nets, implemented food for cash and food for work programs, and boosted
credit for milling facilities which act as an interface between smallholders
and markets. In addition, consistent with the GFRP framework and official
World Bank position in 2008, the GFRP operation subsidized fertilizers by
the suspension of the VAT and by implementing a pilot for “smart subsidies”
using vouchers to be distributed to smallholders. However, this type of policy
was not recommended post-2008, given (as it has been shown in the case of
Malawi) that it bears the risk of significant fiscal deficit. Finally, the government
regulated the fertilizer market in principle to avoid adulteration; however, most
of the adulteration appears to happen in Vietnam (from where fertilizer is
imported) rather than in Cambodia.
(h) Mali: The GFRP operation resulted in policies which were both consistent and
inconsistent with the official policy recommendations of the World Bank and
with what was recommended after 2008. On the consistent side, the government
increased seed availability for locally produced rice varieties and improved
marketing channels to facilitate relationships between producer organizations.
Finally, a program of subsidies for equipment, access to water/irrigation, and
extension services was implemented. On the inconsistent side, the government
introduced 6 month VAT and tariff exemptions for rice, implemented a price-
stabilizing buffer stock through the Food Security Commission, introduced
subsidies on crop inputs which were not “smart subsidies,” and finally, despite
acknowledgement of weak safety nets, made no efforts to strengthen them.
(i) Guinea: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were both consistent and inconsistent with the official World Bank policy
recommendations and with the post-2008 recommendations. On the consistent
side, in both policies recommended in 2008 and after 2008, the government
implemented a safety net system to distribute take-home rations for children
of families of 5C members, an emergency school feeding and nutrition
support, and an emergency urban labor-intensive public works program. On
the inconsistent side, the country imposed a ban on agricultural exports in
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2007; although it was lifted in 2008 for most products, it was not lifted for
rice. Although the GFRP operation did not support this, the government could
have included a conditionality to be able to obtain the loan. In addition, and
consistent with the GRFP framework but not the post-2008 recommendations,
with support from the GFRP, the country was able to eliminate custom duties
for low quality rice between June 1 and October 31, 2008, and initiated plans
to build an emergency food reserve of 25,000 metric tons, although it is
not clear if this is for humanitarian or price-stabilizing purposes. Finally, the
government implemented the “Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support,”
which includes the distribution of subsidized seed and fertilizer packages to
70,000 smallholder farmers, although these were not the type of smart subsidies
proposed by the GRFP framework.
(j) Burundi: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were both consistent and inconsistent with the official World Bank policy
recommendations. On the consistent side, the government scaled up WFP’s
school feeding and nutrition program. However, funds allocation and the
number of beneficiaries fell short of initial goals. In addition, the government
supported the return of refugees to the country. Finally, and consistent with
the GRFP framework but inconsistent with post-2008 recommendations, the
government implemented exemption of transaction taxes and import duties
until July 2009.
(k) Madagascar: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies
which were consistent with the official World Bank policy recommendations.
The government expanded the food for work and school feeding programs
and introduced a rice intensification campaign through producer associations.
This program aims to provide subsidies for selected agricultural technologies
through microfinance institutions. Finally, the government eliminated the VAT
for rice, which, although consistent with the GFRP framework, was not
consistent with post-2008 recommendations.
(l) Sierra Leone: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies
which were both consistent and inconsistent with the official World Bank
policy recommendations. On the consistent side, the government protected
selected basic services from increasing costs of food and fuel (those for hospital
patients, lactating mothers, government’s boarding schools, etc.). In addition,
the tariffs for four products were reduced; this reduction is to be maintained
until prices return to precrisis levels. On the inconsistent side, the government
provided fully subsidized rice seed to farmers (71,000 bushes), which were not
targeted as the “smart subsidies” strategy recommended in the GFRP.
(m) Rwanda: The GFRP operation resulted in policies which were inconsistent
with both the official World Bank policy recommendations and the post-2008
recommendations. Specifically, the government implemented the Crop Intensi-
fication Program for food crops which included significant market intervention
by the government: (a) purchasing fertilizers in bulk in international markets;
(b) auctioning fertilizer to private traders; (c) promoting private microcredit for
smallholders; and (d) providing additional targeted subsidies through vouchers.
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This program has significant risks: mis-targeting, crop leakage (i.e., cannot be
used for export crops), collusion among traders, and an extremely low loan
recovery rate (during a pilot in 2008, recovery was only 4 %).
19.5 Final Remarks
The world faces a new food economy that likely involves both higher and more
volatile food prices, and evidence of both conditions was clear in 2007/08 and 2011.
After the food price crisis of 2007/08, food prices started rising again in June 2010,
with international prices of maize and wheat roughly doubling by May 2011. This
situation imposes several challenges. In the short run, the global food supply is
relatively inelastic, leading to shortages and amplifying the impact of any shock.
The poor are hit the hardest. In the long run, the goal should be to achieve food
security. The drivers that have increased food demand in the last few years are likely
to persist (and even expand). Thus, there is a significant role for the World Bank to
play in increasing the countries’ capacity to cope with this new world scenario and
in promoting appropriate policies that will help to minimize the adverse effects of
the increase in prices and price volatility, as well as to avoid exacerbating the crisis.
In this regard, this chapter describes some of the most important official policies
that the World Bank prescribed to different countries during the food crisis of
2007/08. In addition, it compares those policies to what was proposed by World
Bank research after 2008. The chapter focuses on the proposed short-term, medium,
and long-term policies. In terms of short-term policies, two mechanisms are
emphasized: support for the poor and price stabilization (with an emphasis on trade
restrictions and food reserves). In terms of medium- and long-term policies, we
focus on the recommendations linked to increasing agricultural productivity through
productivity gains and elimination of postharvest losses.
In support of the poor, Targeted Cash Transfers (TCT) and Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT) programs already in place clearly constitute first-best responses for
several reasons: (a) they prioritize assistance for targeted groups, (b) they do not
entail additional costs of food storage and transportation, (c) they do not distort
food markets, and (d) in the case of CCTs, they explicitly prevent human capital
deterioration. When TCTs and CCTs are not available, governments may also
implement other types of assistance programs, although this could bring some
inefficiency. Therefore, in poor countries where TCTs and CCTs are not yet in
place (such as most Sub-Saharan Africa), it is essential that during noncrisis years,
countries invest in strengthening existing programs—and piloting new ones—to
address chronic poverty, achieve food security and human development goals, and
be ready to respond to shocks. Across the different GFRPs, we see these policies
implemented by the World Bank, specifically in the Philippines, Djibouti, Haiti,
Cambodia, Guinea, Burundi, and Madagascar.
In terms of short-term price stabilization policies through trade policies and
management of food reserves, we identify important inconsistencies in what was
recommended in the official position by the World Bank, through the GFRP
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framework document and in the G8’s document prepared for the Ministers of
Finance Meeting in 2008, and in post-2008 recommendations. Clearly, the official
recommendations in 2008 were more flexible, especially in regards to trade policies
and physical reserves, and in some cases allowed short-term interventions that could
end in pervasive market distortions. As a result, most of the operations under the
GFRPs were consistent with the official policy recommendations with the exception
of Cambodia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda (see summary in Table 19.7).
On the other hand, if we look at the post-2008 recommendations, all of them
will avoid any potentially pervasive market distortions. Even more, regarding
trade policies, most of the work of the World Bank will advise against any trade
restrictions (on both the import and the export side). In that sense, if we assess
ex post the GFRP operations, we find that in many of the countries, the policies
implemented as a result of the GFRP created additional trade restrictions other
than export bans, which was the only bad policy identified in the GFRP framework
document. This was the case for Bangladesh, Philippines, Mali, Guinea, Burundi,
and Sierra Leone.
Nevertheless, and as explained in Sect. 19.3, it is important to mention that what
the GFRP framework recommended in 2008 relative to what was recommended
post-2008 is in a certain way justifiable as a short-term measure given that all in
all, trade policies may be an effective instrument for short-term price stabilization
purposes in some nations: those facing considerable political unrest, lacking
adequate food distribution networks, with no safety nets available, etc. However,
they may have important beggar-thy-neighbor consequences and may fuel price
increases of important commodities. The 2007/08 food crisis—especially in the
case of rice—is quite illustrative in this respect. Insulating trade policies imposed
by importers and exporters (as well as high-income and developing countries)
were indeed responsible for a considerable share of price spikes. However, even
when the aggregate effect of the actions of these broad groups is quite large, most
of the turmoil was likely caused by large exporters and importers. In this sense,
if the argument is that such policies create further imbalances for others, policy
recommendations should distinguish between larger and smaller countries; from all
the countries where we see these inconsistencies, the Philippines is the only one
falling into the category of a significant importer of rice where the World Bank
should be clearly against import tenders and quantitative restrictions, given they
clearly helped to exacerbate international prices in the rice market.
With respect to food reserves, the discussion seems to highlight the need for food
reserves to ease the effect of shocks during periods of commodity price spikes and
volatility. There seems to be some consensus around this idea. The disagreement
stems from the specific mechanisms to implement food reserves. As in the case
of trade interventions, the most appropriate choices are likely to depend on the
characteristics of the specific market under intervention, the country’s capacity
to cope with crises, and the possibility of establishing international coordination
mechanisms. While it likely does not make sense to establish national buffer stocks
in most grain markets, it may be more valid in a few cases, such as in the rice
market. Again, however, regional reserves with strong governance and clear triggers
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are preferred. However, it is important to mention that the GFRP framework is not
extremely clear on this in difference to what was recommended post-2008. It is in
that sense that when analyzing the operational plans of the GFRPs, proposals can
be identified that promote country-level reserves as buffer stocks, as in the case of:
(a) Bangladesh where the stocks were increased from 1 to 1.5 million MT of rice,
(b) the NFAs in Philippines, and (c) the NFAs in Guinea. It could also be argued that
these reserves were consistent with the official position of the World Bank through
the GFRP framework, although clearly these types of policies are problematic in
countries where the necessary conditions for these reserves to work don’t exist.
Additionally, buffer stocks usually entail high costs and market distortions and are
prone to corruption. Thus, most countries—especially those with weak institutions
and scarce resources—should probably refrain from using buffer stocks.
Finally, with respect to the medium- and long-term policies, we see significant
investment in the GFRPs (e.g., the provision of infrastructure and public goods
in Mozambique, increasing seed availability in Mali, and the rice intensification
program in Madagascar). In addition, and as recommended in the GFRP framework
document, we also see the important presence of input subsidies similar to those
that have failed in Malawi with a fiscal cost of around 3 % of the GDP. These plans
envisage the implementation of a market-smart approach to input subsidies. Such a
strategy is characterized by: (a) targeting poor farmers; (b) not displacing existing
commercial sales; (c) utilizing vouchers, matching grants, or other instruments
to strengthen private distribution systems; and (d) being introduced for a limited
period of time only. Albeit outlining a sensible rationale, it is unclear how these
principles would be implemented in practice in poor countries like in the GFRPs in
Haiti, Cambodia, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Poorer countries—which likely
have the least developed input markets—may find it difficult to target only those
farmers in need. Additionally, subsidy programs that would strengthen, rather than
displace, the private sector are likely to require complex mechanisms. Institutional
weaknesses of poor countries may render them unfeasible, aside from the fiscal
costs.
It is important to note that in many countries, input markets are not well
developed, as they are hampered by various policy, institutional, and infrastructure
constraints that can only be overcome over time, while improvement in access
to inputs would provide substantial benefits in the short run, given the crisis
circumstances. It is in that sense that the “smart subsidies” proposed under the
GFRP framework could be conceptually justifiable even though as a short-term
measure they can also create fiscal problems as previously mentioned based on the
Malawi experience. Moreover, it is of central importance that any “smart subsidy”
policy includes the five key characteristics mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Furthermore, a long-time horizon is required to apply the “first-best” policies,
namely, the alleviation of constraints (such as infrastructure and missing credit
markets) which inhibit the development of efficient input markets.
Therefore, although this “second best measure” in the face of existing constraints
as stated in the GFRP framework document could be justifiable in the short term the
key is to assure all other needed elements are in place for its success; specifically,
19 Consistency Between Theory and Practice in Policy. . . 509
it has to be guaranteed that investments to alleviate the key constraints of the input
market are also started at the same time. All of these arguments are conceptually
valid, although their applicability in any given country cannot be taken for granted;
in most cases, applicability was not actually and explicitly verified in the assistance
programs funded under GFRP, and the key four characteristics of the proposed
“smart subsidies” strategies were not validated in advance.
In summary, when assessing the consistency of the specific loans and policies
prescribed officially by the World Bank for selected countries during the 2007/08
food crisis, we identify that (given the significant flexibility of the World Bank
official recommendations) most of the loans comply with what was proposed
in the GFRP framework. However, when analyzing the consistency of those
recommendations to the research results published by the World Bank post-2008,
we found significant inconsistencies, especially in short-term policies. As a result,
it is extremely important for the World Bank to carefully assess the risks and costs
of the implementation of the official, more flexible, recommendations of the GFRP
against what is currently being advocated at the Bank and to carefully assess how to
avoid these inconsistencies in the future.
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